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Abstract:  Climate change has already begun impacting economies and 
societies across the globe, and its impacts are expected to increase into the 
future. Adaptation to climate change is and will continue to be one of the 
greatest policy challenges facing the Canadian government. However, im-
portant and much-needed work on understanding the future of climate 
change has not yet been completed. Gaps remain in the body of academic, 
government, and other policy-relevant publications. Specifically, there is a 
relative paucity of research done on the indirect impacts of climate change 
on Canada. These external impacts outside of Canada’s borders may have 
second-order effects, the implications of which have thus far remained 
largely unexplored. In this report, we identify key issue areas which are 
currently or potentially affected by these indirect impacts. We also undergo 
a thorough literature review, and locate areas in which further data re-
search is required. 
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Key Messages 
 
1. Earth’s climate is changing rapidly, but fundamental uncertainties remain. 
The future of our climate-disrupted world, whether by 1.5oC of average warming or more, 
will be characterized by unbounded risk and great uncertainties. The interaction between 
climate change and the wider Earth system remains largely uncharted territory (Steffen et al., 
2015). The nature, pace, and severity of these changes will vary across the planet’s surface, 
affecting countries in different ways and to different degrees. 
  
2. The countries of the world are more integrated than ever before in history; adaptation to climate 
change must also become integrated. 
Although the impacts of climate change will vary around the world, the degree of global 
integration that exists today means that local impacts may have non-local, globalized ramifi-
cations. No country can hope to adapt successfully on its own, without considering its rela-
tionship to the wider community of nations. 
 
3. Knowledge of how Canada will be affected by climate change outside our borders is limited. 
The current state of knowledge on Canada’s international and indirect exposure to climate 
change elsewhere is minimal and fragmented. It can and should be extended, deepened, and 
consolidated. Clear near-term disruptions can be identified, especially with regard to the 
Arctic and evolving Canada-US relations. Even where such knowledge exists, however, it has 
not been completely incorporated into government mandates (Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development, 2017). 
 
4. Distant climate disruptions—i.e. outside North America—should not be discounted or underesti-
mated in their importance for Canada. 
While Canada’s social, political, and economic relationships with the international community 
of nations are primarily with our North American neighbours to the south, this does not 
mean that impacts in these areas are necessarily the most concerning for Canada. Without 
a global assessment, we simply have insufficient information on which to make such a judg-
ment. Changes that could occur farther out in the future, while more uncertain, also require 
serious attention and further study. 
 
5. Mitigation remains the first and most essential requirement for successful adaptation. 
Some degree of climate disruption is ‘baked in’ to the future of the Canadian policy landscape, 
but the difference between a 1.5°C warmer world and a 4°C warmer world carries an ex-
tremely large difference in its adaptation burdens. Reaching the 1.5°C target will be difficult 
but manageable, if Canada and the world commits to massive, concerted efforts towards 
climate change mitigation (Millar et al., 2017). 
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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
Climate change is having increasingly visible and costly impacts on Canada, and around the globe. 
It is imperative that Canada’s government effectively manage both impacts domestically, and adapt 
to its evolving external environment. In spite of clear necessity, an assessment of the Office of 
the Auditor General found that only five government departments have completed their man-
dated assessment of their climate risks, while fourteen have not (Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development, 2017). International risk assessments and analysis of 
adaptation is similarly found wanting in academic, business, government, and NGO literature. In 
our report, we have conducted a thorough literature review of the past decade, identifying the 
extent of current knowledge and gaps that require attention from the broader research commu-
nity. 
 
Key Messages 
1. Earth’s climate is changing rapidly, but fundamental uncertainties remain. 
2. The countries of the world are more integrated than ever before in history; adaptation 
to climate change must also become integrated. 
3. Knowledge of how Canada will be affected by climate change outside our borders is lim-
ited. 
4. Distant climate disruptions—i.e., outside North America—should not be discounted or 
underestimated in their importance for Canada. 
5. Mitigation remains the first and most essential requirement for successful adaptation. 
 
Context and Implications 
In a world of intense globalization and increasing economic interconnectivity, climate change will 
present risks to the global economy that will be unavoidable. Other countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, have found that indirect impacts from climate change may be an order of magnitude 
greater than domestic impacts (Gledhill et al. 2013). The Netherlands has also conducted a similar 
study which arrived at similar conclusions (Vonk et al. 2015). While Canada has its own context, 
and is not necessarily going to experience the same challenges as these other countries, our 
research agenda has identified a clear need to achieve a better understanding of the social, eco-
nomic, and security impacts climate change will have on Canada in the future. 
 
Results 
The Arctic: Climate change is already having dramatic impacts on the Arctic, which is warming 
twice as fast as the rest of the globe (AMAP, 2017). With an earlier-than-expected arrival of ice-
free summers, the opening of the Northwest Passage (NWP) will likely be a commercial reality 
in the next few decades. Furthermore, mineral and fossil fuel resources currently locked under 
ice may become exploitable, and therefore subject to intense geopolitical contestation over ter-
ritorial boundaries and sovereignty rights (Elliot-Meisel, 2009; Loboda, 2014; Pharand, 2007). 
Complicating matters is the issue of melting permafrost. While the risks are better-known than 
in other issue areas, without any armed icebreakers Canada is not militarily prepared to secure 
its sovereignty rights in this region (Wezeman, 2012). 
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Economic Issues and International Trade: Canada has been called an ‘energy superpower’ 
by past governments, thanks in part to high oil prices allowing for economical exploitation of the 
oil sands (Rubin, 2016). However, the possibility that there will be an internationally-set and 
legally-binding carbon price means that there is also the chance that these will become stranded 
assets (Leaton et al., 2015; Rubin, 2015). Presently, carbon pricing schemes are widely considered 
to be too low by various international organizations (Farid et al., 2016). 
 
Transportation and Infrastructure: Given the predominance of gasoline-powered road ve-
hicles in Canada and globally, significant mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions must come from 
the transportation sector. The auto industry may be vulnerable to shocks as the global manufac-
turing capacity shifts towards battery-electric vehicles (Shankleman, 2017). However, the impli-
cations of this potential disruption for Canada have not yet been adequately explored. The Great 
Lakes will likely be significantly affected by climate change in the future. This will have impacts on 
shipping traffic, coastal infrastructure, and Canada-US relations in this region (Millerd, 2011). 
 
Security and Migration: While the exact relationship between climate change and violent con-
flict remains controversial, the possibility of a linkage cannot be ignored. Recent crises like the 
Syrian Civil War may have been caused by environmental factors which may have been exacer-
bated by climate change (Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & Kushnir, 2015). A recent government 
report has identified climate change as a potential source of conflict (Department of National 
Defence, 2017), but otherwise there is a dearth of concrete planning or information on this issue. 
 
Food and Agriculture: Climate change may benefit Canadian agriculture by increasing the 
length of the growing season and expanding the types of crops that can be grown on Canadian 
soil (Lewis & Witham, 2012). As such, Canada stands to benefit from increasing food exports and 
perhaps leveraging its role as a food exporter for diplomacy and geopolitical strategy. However, 
the future of domestic food production, given the likelihood of increases in pests and extreme 
weather events, makes these benefits far from certain (I. D. Campbell, Durant, Hunter, & Hyatt, 
2014). Marine ecosystems and fisheries are also being affected by climate change. The warming 
of the upper ocean is comparable to warming on land, with great risks and uncertainties in its 
impacts on marine life (Poloczanska et al., 2013). Canadian fishing subsidies may be encouraging 
overexploitation, which could create a repeat of the Atlantic Cod fishery collapse if poorly man-
aged (McIlgorm et al., 2010; Sumaila, Lam, Le Manach, Swartz, & Pauly, 2016). 
 
Health and Wellbeing: Climate change has been called the “biggest global health threat of the 
21st century” (Costello et al., 2009, p. 1693). Some of these risks arise from the direct impacts of 
the changing climate and extreme storms, while others are indirect, like the spread of disease 
vectors (Altizer, Ostfeld, Johnson, Kutz, & Harvell, 2013; Keesing et al., 2010). As with other 
issue areas, there is some knowledge and planning at the domestic level, but for international 
considerations there is a gap in our knowledge and policy planning. 
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Foreign Aid and Development: Canada is involved in international projects to assist other 
countries in climate change mitigation and adaptation to climate change (da Costa Silva, 2011). 
Given that the impacts of climate change will intensify, these commitments will likely grow in 
expense and scope over the coming decades (Webster, Ginnetti, Walker, Coppard, & Kent, 
2009). 
 
Biodiversity: Climate change is expected to negatively impact the future of global biodiversity. 
The decline in biodiversity may have implications for Canadian tourism, as well as travel by Ca-
nadian citizens abroad (Amelung, Nicholls, & Viner, 2007; Scott, Jones, & Konopek, 2007). Fur-
thermore, the integrity of regional ecosystems could be affected by interactions with other human 
impacts on the global environment. Preserving global biodiversity will also have implications for 
pharmaceutical availability, as many drugs are based on species in the tropical rainforests that are 
rapidly being depleted (Berrang-Ford, MacLean, Gyorkos, Ford, & Ogden, 2009). Canada is also 
a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Failure to meet CBD targets would have 
negative consequences for Canada’s international perception. 
 
International Law: With the move from the sanctions-based Kyoto Protocol to the voluntary 
process of the Paris Agreement, the risk of internationally-imposed penalties on noncompliance 
with climate targets has been minimized. However, Canadian oil and gas companies may be ex-
posed to transnational lawsuits relating to their carbon-producing activities. Furthermore, while 
this has not yet been implemented, carbon tariffs may be employed in the future and raise the 
costs of Canadian exports, amongst other legal costs. (Byers, Franks, & Gage, 2017; Gage & Byers, 
2014; Osofsky, 2005). 
 
State of Knowledge 
Since the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, our understanding of climate change has grown enormously. 
However, the policies offered by national governments have not kept up with the challenge of 
mitigating climate change. If all the national targets of the Paris Agreement are met, average 
warming of the Earth is projected to surpass the target limit of 1.5-2°C above the preindustrial 
temperature (Anderson, 2015; Schurer, Mann, Hawkins, Tett, & Hegerl, 2017). Furthermore, 
adaptation towards future climate disruptions have not been adequately explored. Paradoxically, 
indirect impacts from outside of Canada’s borders may be costlier than the domestic impacts of 
climate change. This cannot be determined with any level of certainty until Canada requires more 
specific knowledge on these impacts, the opportunities for adaptation, and policy aims which 
could help secure Canada’s future in a climate-disrupted world. 
 
Conclusion 
Canada has some of the highest per-capita greenhouse gas emissions in the world, but it also has 
the wealth and technical capacity to implement the necessary policy solutions. A better under-
standing of the interactions between various climate change impacts, both domestically and in-
ternationally, are needed to identify the avenues for policymakers to meet the challenge of future 
climate change. Undertaking a global assessment of all the risks and uncertainties of climate 
change to Canada would only be a first step, but a useful one. 
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Key Findings 
 
The fraying thread that connects our past to our future is not limited to the flux in the 
natural order. The ecological shake-up wrought by climate change is also shaking up our 
economic and political-order. In the financial realm, as in the natural realm, the past 
provides fewer and fewer clues to our future. Like the migration patterns of songbirds 
that no longer correlate to the hatching patterns of their insect prey, or the mountain 
snowpacks that not longer store water for the dry summer months, the economy is facing 
miscues born of the feedback loop between tumult in the atmosphere and tumult on the 
earth. Rapid changes in the weather and temperature are outpacing our traditional ideas 
for assessing risk, redefining the calculus for economic success, shaking up the geopolitical 
status quo (Schapiro, 2016, p. xi). 
 
Context – the Issue: 
The failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation to date has recently been recognized as 
the greatest risk to the global economy (World Economic Forum, 2016). And while the impacts 
of climate change will vary in nature and severity around the world, they will not respect political 
boundaries. In an increasingly connected and globalized world those impacts must therefore be 
assessed with a transboundary, international framework – i.e. incorporating risks that reach 
across national borders. Such a project has begun in Canada, but it does not compare to the 
rapidly developing body of research on the potential direct consequences of current and future 
climate change within the country. That is, substantial knowledge gaps remain with respect to 
how impacts outside our borders will affect Canada’s environment, socioeconomic systems, trade 
relations, foreign policy, and prospects for achieving the world’s sustainable development goals 
(SDGs). Additionally, the assumption of ‘stationarity’ is no longer tenable; that is, past environ-
mental conditions are no longer an accurate guide to future changes (Milly et al., 2008). This 
report assesses the state of knowledge on the international dimensions of climate change, and 
how impacts and policy changes elsewhere in the world, whether for mitigation or adaptation, 
may affect Canada going forward. 
 
Implications 
Although differing in national circumstances, analysis for the United Kingdom has found that im-
pacts arising due to climate change elsewhere are potentially an order of magnitude higher for 
the UK, through indirect pathways, than the cost of direct domestic impacts (Gledhill et al., 2013). 
In the near term they find that “damages to UK assets abroad, demand on foreign aid and hu-
manitarian assistance, and increased volatility of prices for food, energy and other resources 
traded in the global market,” are all likely to be more severe and costlier than currently projected 
under a medium emissions scenario (Gledhill et al., 2013, p. 1). The Netherlands has also under-
taken a similar national assessment of the global dimensions of climate change and arrives at a 
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similar conclusion; due to its infrastructural, economic, and foreign policy linkages with many 
other countries, climate change impacts in those countries will indirectly affect the Netherlands 
to a high degree as well (Vonk et al., 2015). Canada is certainly in different circumstances than 
the former two national cases. We are far more economically and politically integrated with one 
other country to a high degree—the U.S.—and integrated with many other countries to lesser 
degrees, though in ways that are no less important. Nonetheless, and as mentioned above, with-
out a research agenda devoted to understanding all of our international connections, their expo-
sure to climate change, as well as policy adaptations elsewhere that could affect Canada, it is 
impossible to assess the balance of potential opportunities and threats that the international di-
mension of climate change poses. 
 
Approach 
Given the realities of global climate change, and the need to identify international impacts as well 
as the pathways by which they could affect Canada, a thorough literature review is required to 
assess the state of knowledge on this subject. Overall, there appears to be a relative paucity of 
research that draws explicit links between climate change impacts external to Canada’s borders, 
and social, economic or environmental factors within Canada. Thus, in addition to a survey of 
existing literature, categorization of important issue areas must be established. Criteria for sali-
ence are assessed based on parameters developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), 
and similar national adaptation studies that take a global approach  (Benzie, 2014). Given the 
cross-disciplinary nature of the literature review, and of the very complexity of climate change as 
a policy challenge, some issues discussed in this report will overlap across multiple categories 
simultaneously. 
 
Methodology 
We identified key research issue areas and selected databases available to the Waterloo-Laurier-
Guelph tri-library system. We applied multiple iterations of universal search strings to these da-
tabases and created a centralized project catalog for collected sources. In addition to academic 
sources, including journal articles, books and monographs, we assessed governmental and grey 
literatures, including reports from the federal government, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), international organizations, articles from the business press, and news media. Sources 
were selected based on non-random purposive criteria, some of which were based on leads 
generated from our judgment of materials outside the systematic search results. Once all sources 
were collected, we assessed and synthesized them for salience to future external climate impacts 
on Canada. 
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Results 
 
The Arctic 
Of the various aspects of climate change under discussion, the Arctic stood out as a subject of 
especially high concern to Canada. There are various estimates of hydrocarbon and mineral re-
sources which are currently inaccessible because of permanent Arctic sea ice. As the melting of 
Arctic sea ice increases with climate change, the summer may be open to exploration for primary 
resource extraction. In addition, the Northwest Passage (NWP) will likely be opened for shipping 
traffic over the next few decades. Through resource extraction and taxing shipping lanes, Canada 
could benefit tremendously from a melting Arctic (Koring, 2008). 
However, these potential benefits may be overvalued if Canada implements substantial 
carbon pricing mechanisms domestically, or if such measures are imposed by an international 
agreement. At present, the exact costs or benefits to the opening of the Arctic remain highly 
uncertain. To date, expeditions to the Arctic have shown that despite unprecedented levels of 
sea ice extent minima, operating that environment remains enormously challenging. The Financial 
Times reported that Shell was forced to cancel offshore drilling projects off the coast of Alaska, 
investing over $5bn USD without managing to drill a single well (Pfeifer & Chazan, 2013). There-
after, other oil companies decided to pull out of costly Arctic prospecting without any possibility 
of recouping their costs. One historian also argued that unconventional oil reserves, including 
purportedly massive Arctic reserves, are not based on reliable estimates (Mitchell, 2013). Con-
sequently, assessments of the potential benefits that the Arctic may provide for Canada are wide 
ranging as well as uncertain. 
There are many drawbacks associated with a melting Arctic which may exceed the bene-
fits gained. Permafrost melt is likely to increase, creating roadblocks to building durable infra-
structure. Such impediments have already been observed in Siberia (Morozov, 2012). Increases 
in the rate and intensity of extreme weather and the calving of icebergs may make the NWP 
hazardous to unprotected vessels without the aid of expensive icebreakers and search-and-res-
cue capabilities (Bruce & Haites, 2008). Specifically, icebreakers will play a critical role in ensuring 
the safety of the NWP for shipping traffic (Parsons, Dinwoodie, & Roe, 2011). Permafrost melt 
will additionally have wide-ranging impacts on both human health and terrestrial biodiversity. The 
melting Arctic sea ice and changing temperature structure of the oceans will have further impacts, 
creating new challenges in maintaining marine biodiversity and Canada’s upholding of the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Arctic ecosystems are especially sensitive to Anthropo-
genic influences, and therefore may be strongly and negatively affected by climate change (Darnis 
et al., 2012). 
 Finally, another policy challenge that the melting Arctic poses is competition and control 
over resource extraction and shipping lanes. Pharand (2007) argues that according to his analysis 
of international law and treaties signed by Canada, that the NWP is legally Canadian waters is 
indisputable. However, at least one American commentator has argued that the Arctic in general 
should be declared international waters, and that Canada cannot functionally govern the Arctic 
with its minimal military force projection capability in that region (Dobransky, 2012). According 
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to Elliot-Meisel (2009), failing to quickly negotiate territorial control of the Arctic between Can-
ada and the US could negatively impact international security, through potential increases in en-
vironmental disasters, smuggling, illegal immigration, and even the transit of transnational 
terrorists. Stakeholder rights have also been asserted by the European Parliament, which notes 
that three EU members are a part of the Arctic Council and have vital interests in the region 
(Gahler, 2010). Wezeman (2012) notes that the Arctic region is presently characterized by a lack 
of clarity, with major uncertainties in jurisdiction, sovereignty, policy, and military capabilities. 
Furthermore, while Canada possesses unarmed Coast Guard icebreakers operating under 
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), they are only capable of operating in the summer. 
The Canadian Navy possesses no ice-strengthened warships, and plans to build new icebreakers 
have been seriously delayed and gone overbudget (Wezeman, 2012, 2016). In terms of ground 
forces, Canada fields a battalion-sized force of Canadian Rangers which has been trained and 
equipped for Arctic operations (Wezeman, 2016). A re-assessment of Arctic nations’ capabilities 
found that not only has uncertainty persisted, but tensions have been heightened by recent ag-
gressive behaviour from Russia. Different authors echoed concerns of Russian aggression, and 
also noted China’s expressed interests and challenge to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic 
(Parker & Madjd-Sadjadi, 2010). Researchers in geopolitics also note that changes in important 
trade routes have historically been associated with redeployments of naval forces, geopolitical 
shifts in the balance of power, and thus turmoil amongst the great powers (Blunden, 2012). How-
ever, Wezeman (2016) also concluded that the five Arctic states under review, Canada, the US, 
Russia, Denmark, and Norway, are all still committed to resolving disputes through multilateral 
negotiations and diplomacy. Nonetheless tensions have increased between the US and Russia, 
and given the most recent events at the time of writing, this situation is still far from resolved. 
Should Canada lose jurisdiction over the Arctic, Canada’s territorial sovereignty would 
be challenged and access to any benefits would be likely diminished. The contentious nature of 
Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic, and the security conflicts that may result from competition 
over Arctic shipping lanes and resources, have been identified as a major concern for the future 
of Canadian foreign policy. For Asian exporters like China and Japan, the NWP may offer a sub-
stantial benefit by reducing travel times and costs in shipping goods to Europe (Parker & Madjd-
Sadjadi, 2010). Given the strong rhetoric and proliferation of research on the issue, the rhetoric 
on Arctic sovereignty and Arctic governance does not seem to match with actual policy outcomes. 
On the other hand, the security challenges associated with the melting Arctic may not necessarily 
be as dire as some authors have purported. For example, the NWP is not considered a vital 
strategic chokepoint by the US military, and that situation may not necessarily change in the 
future from melting sea ice (Parker & Madjd-Sadjadi, 2010). In any case, the authors mentioned 
here have urged Canada explicitly (or through analysis of Arctic countries’ national interests, 
implicitly) to expand its role and presence to preserve its territorial sovereignty and expand 
governance over the Arctic. 
 
Economic Issues and International Trade 
Another key dimension through which climate change impacts or adaptions elsewhere may affect 
Canada is through its economic relationships, including in trade, finance, and overall domestic 
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business competitiveness in international markets. There is currently no consensus on the net 
balance of potential changes being positive or negative, though nor may there ever be such a 
consensus. There are important points of agreement, however, on several critical issues. 
One of the first important and agreed-upon concerns is the status of our hydrocarbon 
industries, and what it will mean for all those involved in them should they soon enter their 
‘sunset phase’ (Rubin, 2016). Decarbonization of the global economy, to the extent that it pro-
gresses, will invariably cause some degree of demand reduction for Canada’s fossil fuel resources, 
especially the oil sands, already one of the highest-cost producers in the world. Although it has 
been primarily due to a glut of production in the U.S. and elsewhere, some of the potential effects 
of demand reduction have already been evident in Alberta over the past three years: With the 
price of oil hovering around $50 per barrel over that time, “[a]n estimated US$47 billion of oil 
sands projects containing 8.2 billion barrels of oil reserves have already been cancelled or indefi-
nitely postponed” (Rubin, 2016, p. 4). With the price of oil in its current range, expansion of the 
oil sands has become far less certain today than when former Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
touted Canada as a potential ‘energy super power’ over a decade ago. 
Moreover, the increasing recognition that previously economical reserves—when oil 
prices are high—may never make it to market, resulting in further and more severe write-downs 
and losses, is an eventuality that has been called a ‘carbon bubble,’ ‘unburnable carbon,’ or, more 
frequently in a general financial sense, as the risk of ‘stranded assets’ (Leaton et al., 2015; Rubin, 
2015). Although not the first to raise it, Governor of the Bank of England (and former Governor 
of the Bank of Canada) Mark Carney has echoed the concern over stranded asset risk, first in 
2014 at a speech for the World Bank (Shankleman, 2014). And one estimate of the global carbon 
bubble amounts to US$20 trillion (Fullerton, 2011)—higher than any total estimate of the worst 
losses incurred by the Great Recession. Canada would not be immune from the effects of this 
bubble bursting or deflating, as the case may be. 
There remains uncertainty in the literature regarding the nature of stranded asset risk 
and the trajectory of oil sands development in a carbon-constrained world (Leach, 2016). Con-
clusions are highly speculative and depend on assumptions not only about the future price of oil, 
but also on assumptions about the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technolo-
gies, or geoengineering projects that could allow the continued emission of GHGs (ostensibly 
without further warming of the atmosphere and oceans). Based on such differences, McGlade 
and Ekins arrive at widely differing conclusions in two separate analyses only one year apart (2014, 
2015); in the first, they find the potential for bitumen production growth up to 4.1 million barrels 
per day (mbd) by the year 2035, whereas in the second they predict a cessation of all bitumen 
production by 2040, with rapidly declining production after 2020. Each pathway would have stark 
differences in impacts for Canada, but there is no consensus on which pathway is more likely, 
and therefore what the most likely impacts will be. The Province of Alberta, for its part, currently 
projects growth in bitumen production—from approximately 2.5mbd to over 3mbd by 2020—
but this, too, is debated and uncertain (Healing, 2017; Johnson, 2017). 
The same uncertainty surrounds Canada’s natural gas resources. Natural gas is often pre-
sented as a ‘bridge fuel’—i.e. between CO2-intensive hydrocarbons and the future mix of low-
emission sources to be decided upon for a carbon-constrained world. As such, there are esti-
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mates of potential short-to-medium term growth in the natural gas industry, presenting an op-
portunity to purportedly offset some of the losses incurred should Canadian oil production hit 
its peak and begin to decline (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). This no-net-loss outcome depends criti-
cally on infrastructural expansion of liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities, however, discussions 
about which are occurring in British Columbia and Alberta. But in the medium-to-long term, the 
ratcheting up of mitigation efforts can be expected to eventually cause demand reduction for 
natural gas as well, leading to a risk of infrastructural ‘overbuild,’ should the LNG facilities be built 
and no longer necessary after a certain point (Leach, 2016). 
Another point of concern is the status of other emission-intensive sectors, including non-
hydrocarbon resources (such as forestry, paper, steel) and in higher valued-added manufacturing 
that relies on carbon-intensive inputs, such as manufacturing vehicles and vehicle parts. As the 
price on carbon increases, nationally as well as internationally, these industries will also be af-
fected, though to a less severe degree than fossil fuel producers. Unfortunately, the state of 
knowledge on these areas does not seem to have been updated beyond that of Natural Resource 
Canada’s own assessment in 2014, which states: “There is little published research about indirect 
impacts of climate change on industry, such as changes associated with consumer demand, supply 
chains, real estate or other assets, adaptation by other sectors, legal liability or government reg-
ulation” (Kovacs, Thistlethwaite, Scott, & Oliver, 2014, p. 137). And the focus in that work is 
primarily domestic, rather than international, where there appears to be even more of a 
knowledge gap. 
Major international fora—the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) for example—are all in alignment on the need for more and higher carbon pricing: 
currently only 12% of global GHGs are priced, and those that are covered are often priced too 
low to meet environmental objectives (Farid et al., 2016). Recognizing the exposure to higher 
costs as the price on carbon climbs, the FSB has called for climate change-related financial disclo-
sures; but there is a high degree of uncertainty over how they may affect Canadian financial 
institutions and industries (Weber & Kholodova, 2017; Bak, 2017).  
As was discussed in the previous section on the Arctic, climate change and actions by 
other countries will have economic effects for Canada in that region as well. Warming and the 
consequent retreat of summer sea ice is opening up the possibility of navigation and shipping, and 
potential mining for resources. But as with bitumen in Alberta, Arctic natural resources are costly, 
perhaps the only more expensive deposits of hydrocarbons and other minerals. The state of 
hydrocarbon production in the region will depend on multiple factors, including the resolution of 
sovereignty issues, cost and price dynamics of particular resources, as well as the protection of 
biodiversity. Beyond the direct biophysical impacts and increasing movement though the Arctic, 
how the former factors will play out remains deeply speculative. 
On the other hand, while there is agreement that the transition effects and costs of 
downscaling the fossil fuel industry in Canada are serious and potentially very high, there is other 
work suggesting that the opportunities are equally as high, perhaps enough to offset the costs. 
Blair (2016) analyzes the claim that concerns over a loss of competitiveness—what he calls the 
framing of a necessary ‘trade-off’ between positive environmental outcomes and economic out-
comes—have been exaggerated in Canada, especially under the former Harper government. As 
the Chretien and Martin governments did at an earlier point in time, the Trudeau government is 
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again preferring to opt for what Blair calls a ‘synergy’ framing, suggesting that improvement on 
environmental outcomes could improve our economic performance overall, more than offsetting 
losses in emission-intensive sectors. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in this work 
Blair focuses on the nature and consequences of these framings, rather than the estimates them-
selves of the potential real costs and benefits of a transition away from hydrocarbons. While 
framing is indeed critical, the real costs and benefits of this transition must continually be sought 
out and appraised as well. 
On the assessment of potential opportunities, recent research emphasizes the likelihood 
that as global mitigation increases, low-carbon goods and services (LCGS) industries will expand, 
and we should therefore be thinking strategically about these markets (Leach, 2016). In Canada, 
LCGS markets could grow to anywhere between $36 to $60 billion by 2050, up from $7.9 billion 
in 2010 (NRTEE, 2012). At the moment, though, Canada is not poised to take full advantage of 
these opportunities: “Canada’s current market share as a global supplier of LCGS is far from what 
it could be. Canada’s LCGS sectors could well face labour shortages in a world competing for 
skills and innovative talent. Regional emissions profiles and related economic interests differ 
markedly and have precluded a comprehensive, long-term approach to climate policy to date,” 
according to the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE, 2012, p. 
16). Other work confirms the action of other countries in moving toward specifically green in-
novation, a sector dominated by Europe, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and China, along with the 
potential benefits of trade in ‘climate-friendly’ and ‘environment-friendly’ goods, especially with 
Asia (Nikzad & Sedigh, 2017; Dinda, 2014). Opportunities also exist in increased food production 
and export, as warming extends the growing season (Rubin, 2015; Lewis & Witham, 2012). Clean 
Energy Canada has noted that a traditional resource sector for Canada—metals mining—will 
likely benefit from global growth in the renewable energy sector, as Canada possesses 14 of the 
19 most common metals required for solar photovoltaics (Clean Energy Canada, 2017). 
In sum, however, barring rapid improvements in CCS or a global geoengineering project, 
the logical conclusion of successful global mitigation will mean leaving much of the planet’s—and 
Canada’s—hydrocarbons in the ground. As this scenario will play out over the coming decades, 
the sooner that Canada prepares for it, the better positioned we will be to take advantage of the 
opportunities and offset (potentially inevitable) losses. 
 
Transportation and Infrastructure 
The electrification of transportation, both commercial and private passenger transport, will be 
necessary for transport sector emissions to be reduced (Weber & Kholodova, 2017). However, 
while there is a growing amount of research on how climate change will directly impact the 
transportation sector (see Palko & Lemmen, 2016) there is an absence of information on how 
the Canadian auto industry, and the transportation sector more broadly, will be affected by policy 
and industrial changes outside our borders. 
For instance, critical physical components of the automotive industry will undergo radical 
changes to meet mitigation targets through electrification. Some analysis suggests that electric 
vehicle penetration of the passenger vehicle market will occur along a baseline, business-as-usual 
pathway only after the year 2040. But appropriate climate, energy and transportation policies 
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chosen by Canadian governments could expedite this uptake by a decade or more, and contribute 
to GHG abatement in the transport sector (Bahn et al., 2013). What the costs and benefits of 
such a transition will mean for the Canadian automotive industry have not been adequately ex-
plored, however. For instance, our review found no anticipatory analysis of how rapidly advancing 
battery development in other countries could affect the nature of this industry in Canada. The 
Economics Department of ING has analyzed the risk for the European automotive industry, sug-
gesting that the development of battery electric vehicles (EV) will be disruptive for European 
auto-makers and parts manufacturers if they do not begin making this shift themselves (Erich & 
Witteveen, 2017). Other work explores global aspects of the shift to renewables for the auto-
motive industry, as well as the impacts that it may have on global demand for petroleum 
(Shankleman, 2017); but again, the risks and opportunities for Canada are unknown due to a lack 
of Canadian industry-specific research. 
Another infrastructural issue with international connections, though primarily bilateral 
ones with the United States, regards new pipeline development for petroleum or natural gas 
exports. As was discussed earlier in the section on hydrocarbon resources, however, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty about the costs and benefits of such projects, which depend critically on 
the state of US production and consumption. Should the recent rise in US shale and tight oil peak 
or decline, there remains room for Canadian supply to meet American demand (Hussain, 2016); 
but perhaps not at an increasing rate, and not enough to offset the costs of new pipeline con-
struction. (Domestically, the TransCanada corporation has decided to not proceed with its pro-
posed $15.7 billion Energy East Pipeline, taking a $1 billion write-down in the process.) 
The Great Lakes also serve as an important route of international shipping between Can-
ada and the U.S., as well as other countries, with a large variety of products being shipped through 
the Great Lakes such as grains, gravel, cement, salt, iron ores, coal, and petroleum products. 
Climate change is expected to have several potentially likely effects on the Great Lakes’ system. 
Changes in precipitation patterns are likely with more intense spring rains in the watershed (lead-
ing to increased erosion and effluent of pollutants into the lakes) and increased drought in the 
summer months (Bush, Loder, Mortsch, & Cohen, 2014; Hayhoe, VanDorn, Croley, Schlegal, & 
Wuebbles, 2010; Kling et al., 2003). Water temperatures have increased by as much as 3.5oC in 
the last century (Austin & Colman, 2007, 2008; Dobiesz & Lester, 2009; Minns, Moore, Doka, & 
St. John, 2011) and are projected to increase by 2.9 to 6oC in the next century (Chu, 2015; 
Trumpickas, Shuter, & Minns, 2008, 2009).  Warming water temperatures are leading to other 
impacts such as the earlier onset of a thermocline (reduced oxygen in bottom water); shifted 
thermocline depths; reduced times of ice cover; and altered ecosystem compositions (Brown & 
Duguay, 2010; Bruce & Haites, 2008; Chu, 2015; Kling et al., 2003; McDermid et al., 2015; Millerd, 
2011; Minns, Shuter, & Fung, 2014). Increased water temperatures combined with decreased ice 
cover are resulting lower water levels (McDermid et al., 2015). 
 As climate change has physical impacts on the great lakes (i.e., water temperature and 
depth), the social, economic, cultural, and human health of communities surrounding the Great 
Lakes as well as ecosystem services derived from lakes will also be impacted (TEEB, 2011). The 
Great Lakes are important for a range of industries as well as the recreation, tourism, and agri-
cultural sectors.  The Mowatt Centre has estimated that by 2030, $9.61 billion of economic losses 
will result from low water levels and that by 2050 the cumulative economic losses will reach 
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$18.82 billion (Shlozberg, Dorling, & Spiro, 2014). These economic losses result from impacts to 
various sectors including recreational boating and fishing, commercial shipping, and hydroelectric 
generation. 
Each physical impact of climate change (e.g. increased water temperature) alone could 
have effects on navigation and shipping, but in combination, and especially with lowered water 
levels, the effects would be more profound. According to Millerd (2011), commercial ships in the 
Great Lakes operate with very minimal under-keel clearances (0.3 meters in some cases), so a 
lower water level would require restrictions on vessel drafts and reductions in vessel cargos, 
likely leading to rising costs. A 1 meter drop in water levels would result in a 14% reduction in 
cargo load increasing costs for shipping companies (Shlozberg et al., 2014). The St Lawrence 
would be less affected by such a consideration, but will not be immune to other direct impacts 
like those raised for the Great Lakes. Not all climate change impacts are negative for the Great 
Lakes shipping industry; climate change will lead to an increased ice-free season and therefore a 
longer navigation season. There is dearth of research on the international aspects of this subject 
matter area, however. 
 
Security and Migration 
Several studies have now drawn links between climate change and organized violence. Civil wars, 
ethnic cleansings, and other forms of internecine violence may increase due to linkages to climate 
change or other kinds of global environmental degradation (Homer-Dixon, 2001; Zhang, Brecke, 
Lee, He, & Zhang, 2007). One recent study argued for a linkage between the ongoing Syrian Civil 
War with climate change-induced drought (Kelley et al., 2015). Apart from civil wars and ‘low 
intensity’ conflict, there is also the risk of classic interstate wars. While interstate warfare is 
unlikely to occur as a direct result of climate change per se, the possibility has been noted in 
specific circumstances. Riverine states, in which the downstream state is militarily stronger than 
the upstream state, may come to blows over control over freshwater resources. Egypt and Sudan 
are a potential future case of such a ‘water war’ (Homer-Dixon, 2001). In addition, it is highly 
probable that increased violence will trigger refugee crises in the future. The 40,000 Syrian refu-
gees taken last year by the Canadian government will likely be dwarfed in the future, if violent 
conflicts proliferate due to the pressures applied by climate change (Government of Canada, 
2017). 
 Not all refugee flows are driven by violence. One recent study estimated that the number 
of migrants which might be displaced by sea level rise alone could be as high as 1.4 billion by 2060, 
dwarfing any previous historical precedent (Geisler & Currens, 2017). If mitigation efforts fail 
utterly, and median projections have underestimated the magnitude of future climate change, it 
is possible that parts of the Earth may be rendered uninhabitable to humans due to heat stress 
by 2100 (Sherwood & Huber, 2010). As the Stern Review notes, climate change will impact some 
parts of the world worse than others. The regions which will likely be the most severely impacted 
also tend to be developing countries, which are less able to divert their stretched government 
budgets to adapting to the impacts of climate change domestically (Stern, 2006). However, it is 
also important to note that the notion of ‘climate refugees’ is legally problematic, and estimates 
of future climate-driven migration flows are subject to high variability and uncertainty. Indeed, 
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this argument was made in the Working Group II report in the most recent the IPCC update. 
The IPCC presented a case against quantifying projections of people rendered as legal refugees 
specifically from climate change, as international law has not yet clearly adopted the idea of the 
environmental refugee (Adger et al., 2014). Furthermore, extremely high estimates of people 
who move to another location because of climate change contains the problematic assumption 
that “climate refugees” have become refugees in the colloquial sense. People who may choose to 
move without being placed in a vulnerable, disempowered position that is commonly associated 
with refugees. However, even under this more favourable interpretation of climate change-in-
duced displacement, significant barriers to resettlement cannot be discounted wholesale by Ca-
nadian policymakers (Geisler & Currens, 2017). 
 What will such climate conflicts mean for Canada? While it is something of a cliché that 
Canada is blessed with the longest undefended border on Earth, it is also probably one of the 
least vulnerable states to future climate change impacts. However, our relative safety from the 
worst of climate change and high standard of living also incentivizes inflows of migrations (Murray, 
2010). In some estimates of future environment-driven migration flows, a part of which would be 
driven by climate change, the numbers of refugees could reach historically unprecedented levels 
(Myers, 2002). Furthermore, Canada’s future relationship with the US may not always be so 
friendly. One Canadian journalist and historian created a possible scenario in which a water con-
flict may occur between Canada and the US, as a result of climate-caused water scarcity (Dyer, 
2008). His scenario was based on a report by the US Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) think tank, which noted a potential conflict arising from the diversion of the Great 
Lakes resulting in a “fundamental clash of interests with Canada” (K. M. Campbell et al., 2007, p. 
74). These suggestions may seem alarmist, as Canada has had a friendly relationship and military 
alliance with the US, with a history of over 70 years of strong bilateral cooperation (Elliot-Meisel, 
2009). Nonetheless, a future breakdown in friendly relations is not far outside the realm of pos-
sibility. 
 Overall, relatively few studies have drawn explicit links between Canada and climate-
driven violent conflict, especially within peer-reviewed academic journals. These arguments are 
more frequently seen in think tank reports, editorial opinion articles, or in popular nonfiction 
books. This paucity research may be related to the academic controversy in hypothesis that cli-
mate change may be the cause of civil wars (Buhaug, 2010). Substantive policy recommendations 
are by-and-large offered only in the case of managing the Arctic and preserving Canadian sover-
eignty there (Elliot-Meisel, 2009). Elliot-Meisel argued that Canada must aim to preserve its “spe-
cial relationship” with the US, seeking conciliation and harmony of interests in the Arctic, rather 
than the antagonistic position adopted by the government at time of writing. In general, very little 
has been explicitly written on Canada’s future policy responses to very large numbers of refugees 
and environmental migrants compelled by climate change. Nonetheless, further research into this 
issue is, in our judgment, both warranted and likely to continue to increase in importance as 
climate change accelerates further beyond the old Holocene global climate. Another report has 
been recently published by the Canadian military leadership, emphasizing three major points: the 
increased need for humanitarian response; the aggravation of socioeconomic stressors and re-
sulting forced migrations; and the array of security challenges which are expected to emerge from 
the melting Arctic (Department of National Defence, 2017). 
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Agriculture, Food and Marine Ecosystems 
In terms of the net of all food production, Canadian productivity is expected to increase some-
what in the medium term (I. D. Campbell et al., 2014). This will provide an advantage to Canada 
as other regions in the world will likely see their productivity decline. Growing seasons will be 
longer, while the occurrence of killing frosts will decline. Crops that have thus far been climatically 
unsuited for Canadian farms may become a future possibility. In Eastern Canada, production of 
soybeans, for example, may actually increase (Antón, Kimura, Lankiski, & Cattaneo, 2012). Ex-
ports of agricultural products would likely increase, though challenges for farmers may be exac-
erbated from new uncertainties (I. D. Campbell et al., 2014). Overall, given the strong likelihood 
of a net increase in productivity, the strong future of Canadian agriculture may be considered a 
strategic advantage which could also provide a source of strategic and diplomatic strength. 
However, these projections may be over-optimistic, as some studies have not included a 
full set of modelled factors. Highly uncertain and difficult-to-project factors include the prolifera-
tion of crop pests and the locations of and measurement of increases in drought and severe 
weather, which would negatively impact Canadian agriculture. Throughout the twentieth century, 
the net amount of drought as increased, likely due to the onset of anthropogenic climate change 
(Dai, 2011a). A state of permanent drought, in other words, permanent desertification in some 
regions, is projected to encompass large areas in North America which currently serve as bread-
baskets (Dai, 2011b). Certain crops, such as wheat and barley, are projected to decline under 
increased weather variability in the Canadian prairies (Antón et al., 2012). This weather variability 
could include not only drought, but storms and higher precipitation in other regions which could 
pose enormous challenges to Canadian farmers. Such challenges to future food production, and 
of global food prices, may therefore be strongly impacted by the increased drought under global 
warming. 
Another consideration for Canada is the measurement of food miles, and the carbon 
emissions associated with transportation and importation of foodstuffs. One study found that 
30% of agricultural and food commodities consumed in Canada were imported, resulting in an 
additional 3.3 million tons of CO2 emissions per year (Kissinger, 2012). If a carbon price were 
implemented domestically or internationally, this could have an impact on food prices, especially 
fresh fruits and vegetables which comprise the majority of imported food (Kissinger, 2012). Can-
ada’s reliance on imported foods of this type is therefore an important source of vulnerability in 
climate changed world. Furthermore, some kinds of crops are endangered extreme weather ex-
acerbated by climate change, such as coffee and oranges (Bruce & Haites, 2008). Given these 
projections, it seems probable that the prices of specific food products will increase with advanc-
ing climate change, especially fresh fruit and vegetables. However, as we have seen in other issue 
areas, there are few studies which assess the future of Canadian policy in managing climate-driven 
changes to agriculture. From this, we now turn to a review of the literature available on the 
management of oceans and fisheries. 
Significant attention to how climate change will affect Canadian fisheries is highly recom-
mended by researchers (McIlgorm et al., 2010). Some authors also recommended stronger in-
ternational cooperation in both research and policy implementation in protecting fisheries 
globally (Ricketts & Hildebrand, 2011). As ocean acidification progresses and non-climate-related 
stressors accumulate, it is very likely that the marine biosphere will be severely impacted (K. M. 
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Campbell et al., 2007). Warming of the ocean surface is comparable to recent terrestrial warming 
under climate change. As such, marine biodiversity has been driven to migrate, with phytoplank-
ton being highly responsive to temperature changes. The marine food web is therefore disrupted, 
as a mismatch between the ranges of the lowest tropic level and all other levels grows wider 
(Poloczanska et al., 2013). In tropical latitudes, subtropical fish species are being threatened by 
increase heat stress from the warming ocean (Cheung, Watson, & Pauly, 2013). While there is 
still large uncertainties in assessing the overall impact climate change will have on marine ecosys-
tems, it seems probable that many important species will be placed at risk of extinction (Keating, 
2007). In terms of commercial fisheries, climate change is expected to introduce significant un-
certainties and alter the ranges and migration patterns of important fish species in the waters 
around North America and globally. Ongoing and future changes to the marine ecosystems also 
have complex socioeconomic impacts on local communities which are reliant on fishing (Perry et 
al., 2011). 
The policy challenge is about how to address the variable impacts of climate changes on 
diverse fisheries in some way where local fisheries are healthy and Canada’s position in interna-
tional markets remains strong. This requires international cooperation but also innovative ways 
to engage local people in governance to avoid moratoria, as witnessed in mismanagement of the 
Atlantic Cod fisheries (Ommer & The Coasts Under Stress Research Project Team, 2007). With 
respect to the impact climate change will have on the oceans, Canada has the potential to become 
the global leader in ocean and fisheries legislation and policy action. However, climate change is 
not the only challenge facing marine ecosystems and fisheries. Globally subsidies for fisheries are 
amount to $35bn USD, which has incentivized overfishing in many regions. Indeed, Canada in 
particular has a mixed record with fishing subsidies (Sumaila et al., 2016). As we have seen from 
the case of the Atlantic Cod, the management of stable populations must be carefully considered 
by Canadian policymakers. 
 
Health and Wellbeing 
Climate change has been called “the biggest global health threat of the 21st century” (Costello et 
al., 2009, p. 1693). An increasing amount of research has been dedicated to assessing the nature 
of the threat that it poses to health, and in this vein there is a growing body of knowledge on 
how direct, biophysical impacts from a changing climate may affect Canadians, in particular 
through extreme weather events and natural disasters (such as heat stress, flooding, and forest 
fires, for example; see Berrang-Ford et al., 2009; Costello et al., 2009; Ford et al., 2010; Paterson 
et al., 2012). But there has been a low prioritization with regard to the international dimension 
of this issue area, within which there is thus a clear knowledge gap.  
Changing disease vectors is one instance of recognized risk – longer and warmer summer 
seasons on average are expected to change the prevalence and incidence of disease bearing ticks, 
and forest-damaging beetles, and potentially of malaria (Berrang-Ford et al., 2009). And Canadians 
who live or travel abroad, for work or tourism, may be exposed to worsening risk landscapes 
due to similar extreme weather and disease prevalence changes elsewhere. The Lancet and Uni-
versity College London Global Health Commission on Managing the Health Effects of Climate 
Change (2009) is still the foundational work in this issue-area. Direct and indirect links to Canada 
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are rarely explicitly rarely raised in the document, but in detailing the effects elsewhere, in places 
where Canada has humanitarian, migration, or economic relationships, there is the potential for 
increased risk exposure and adverse outcomes. 
In sum, while most of the suspected health impacts of climate change will affect Canadians 
through direct, domestic changes, it is difficult to assert that international pathways will not also 
have comparable health impacts on Canadians. Other countries have recognized this risk and are 
beginning to systematically assess it, including the UK (Gledhill et al., 2013) and the Netherlands 
(Vonk et al., 2015). 
 
Foreign Aid and Development 
Canada is currently funding or otherwise participating in transnational projects relating to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. For example, Canada is financing community-based water man-
agement projects in Latin America, under the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) (da Costa Silva, 2011). Given the strong probability that states which will be the most 
severely impacted by climate change will be the least able to adapt effectively, it is therefore also 
likely that Canada’s contributions to foreign adaptation projects will increase. Some of these 
projects may be help Canada better meet its national and international climate goals. A future 
domestic legal regime or global governance effort may have strong penalties for noncompliance, 
or rewards for cooperation. By assisting developing countries with mitigation and adaptation 
projects, Canada could go beyond its originally set targets in cost-effective ways. Assisting devel-
oping countries with adaptation projects would also reduce the incentive for outmigration from 
severely impacted countries. However, other researchers have argued that some forms of disas-
ter relief and development assistance may create perverse incentives. Johnston (2012) argued 
that post-disaster relief can effectively subsidize and incentivize development in vulnerable areas, 
creating an net economic loss. Overall, though, peer-reviewed analysis supporting these policies 
is relatively scarce. 
 In addition to funding foreign adaptation projects, Canada is involved with humanitarian 
assistance efforts and disaster response measures across the globe. Our contributions to domes-
tic efforts are certain to increase, as extreme weather events will become more frequent and 
devastating (McBean, 2006). Consequently, we expect such events to be increasingly costly as the 
global climate continues to warm and destabilize. McBean (2006) has also made the case for 
greater Canadian involvement in humanitarian relief efforts, as our country is amongst those with 
the highest levels of per capita cumulative emissions and therefore a greater share of moral re-
sponsibility. Webster et al. (2009) also find that the financial requirements for humanitarian relief 
are projected to increase by up to 1600% over the next 20 years, in large part due to the effects 
of climate change. On a business-as-usual, unsuccessful mitigation pathway, climate change is pro-
jected to reduce the income of an average person on Earth by roughly 23% by 2100, but the 
distribution of impacts will be highly unequal: average incomes in the poorest 40% of countries 
are projected to be reduced by 75%, while the richest 20% of countries may experience slight 
gains (Burke et al. 2015). It is an open question for academics and policy makers alike how such 
changes could affect Canadian foreign policy with regard to aid and humanitarian assistance. 
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Biodiversity 
Climate change is having an impact on biodiversity worldwide, resulting in changes to species 
ranges and behaviours, and even leading to extinction and extirpation (I.-C. Chen, Hill, 
Ohlemuller, Roy, & Thomas, 2011; Hannah et al., 2002; Montoya & Raffaelli, 2010; Parmesan, 
2006; Parmesan & Yohe, 2003; Root et al., 2003). Changes in biodiversity elsewhere—in other 
countries, or international waters—will likely manifest as impacts on ecosystem services, health 
and wellbeing through changes in disease vectors, loss of sites elsewhere for tourism, potential 
impacts on pharmaceuticals bioprospecting, and potentially through international ‘shaming’ effects 
for failing to protect certain species, should that be the case (as is likely with the polar bear); or 
being non-compliant or in violation of treaty obligations to protect, conserve or sustain certain 
other species (as may be the case with marine biodiversity). 
Biodiversity is critical for the provision of ecosystem services upon which society relies, 
including decomposition and nutrient cycling, carbon capture and storage, pollination, food pro-
duction, air purification, and water filtration as well as intrinsic cultural values (Mace, Norris, & 
Fitter, 2012; Oliver et al., 2015).  As biodiversity declines due to climate change, so will the 
delivery and regulation of ecosystem services (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, & 
Courchamp, 2012; Nelson et al., 2009).  Ecosystem services have been linked to human well-
being with a decline in ecosystem services resulting in decreased human well-being (Hossain, 
Eigenbrod, Amoako Johnson, & Dearing, 2017; Sandifer, Sutton-Grier, & Ward, 2015). For exam-
ple, without animal species dispersing seeds, many plants, both wild and domestic, would fail to 
reproduce leading to a food shortage.  It has been estimated that the agricultural value of wild 
pollinators is billions of dollars a year in the United States alone (Reed, 2017).  A decline in 
ecosystem services internationally may result in an increased need for humanitarian aid due to 
shortages of food and clean water. 
Humanitarian aid may also be required due to changes in disease vectors as a result of a 
decreased biodiversity (Morand, Jittapalapong, Suputtamongkol, Abdullah, & Huan, 2014). In-
creased rates of zoonotic and vector-borne diseases among humans, other animals, and plants 
have been linked to biodiversity loss (Keesing et al., 2010; Morand et al., 2014).  Additionally, 
climate change has been found to weaken biotic regulation of disease vectors due to changes in 
the populations of predators and competitors (Altizer et al., 2013; Farjana, Tuno, & Higa, 2012; 
Hobbelen, Samuel, Foote, Tango, & LaPointe, 2013).  A change in disease vectors would not only 
impact human well-being but would also act to further decrease biodiversity. The pharmaceutical 
industry is also particularly dependant on biodiversity. The more biodiversity there is on the 
planet, the greater the opportunity for biodiscovery and finding new pharmaceutical treatments. 
Approximately 25% of prescription drugs are derived directly from plants and 73% are modelled 
after natural substances (Reed, 2017). A loss in biodiversity, particularly in tropical regions where 
most planets with pharmaceutical value are found, will result in missed opportunities to discover 
new cures and treatments for human diseases.  Losses of biodiversity elsewhere may lead to a 
shortage of some pharmaceuticals in Canada. 
Another consideration is the impact that changes in biodiversity may have on domestic 
and international tourism.  Losses of iconic species in Canada’s protected areas may decrease the 
number of visitors to protected areas.  For example, if polar bears are no longer found in Polar 
Bear Provincial Park, the number of visitors to that park is likely to decrease. Furthermore, losses 
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to biodiversity in other countries may decrease the attractiveness of those destinations to Cana-
dian travellers. Other impacts of biodiversity loss in Canada due to climate change include inter-
national shaming and implications from failing to meet international obligations.  Canada is a 
signatory to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Through this treaty, 
193 parties committed to reducing rates of biodiversity loss by 2010. In 2010, parties to the CBD 
agreed on a new set of biodiversity targets to be achieved by 2020 – the Archi Biodiversity 
Targets. Target 12 of the Archi Biodiversity Targets states that “by 2020 the extinction of known 
threatened species has been prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most 
in decline, has been improved and sustained” (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2010).  If Canada fails to meet this target, or other related targets, international shaming 
and negative international perceptions of Canada may occur. 
 
International Law 
With the move toward voluntary, nationally determined contributions to mitigation, the potential 
legal impacts affecting Canada in the sphere of climate change appear minimal, and would likely 
occur in the form of economic or financial effects – i.e. through the possibility of litigation for 
liability or negligence issues. But the risk of this occurrence is higher domestically than interna-
tionally. In tort law, the “duty to care” principle could be employed for this purpose, which states 
that whenever an action or inaction could foreseeably harm others, the action or inaction that 
causes such harm is ethically culpable; thus, a legal obligation to ‘take care’ is imposed on actors 
requiring their adherence to a standard of reasonable care, such that the foreseeable harms are 
reduced and redress is available should they still occur. In recent years in several countries, legal 
actions have been initiated by citizens against their own governments for inaction on climate 
abatement and mitigation, including in Canada (Mittelstaedt, 2008). Legal actions that are exclu-
sively domestically focused, however, while nonetheless important, are outside the scope of this 
review. 
On the international dimension, Osofsky (2005), Gage & Byers (2014), and Byers et al., 
(2017) are examples of important legal scholarship on the issue of climate change. Osofsky details 
the petition made by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, with support from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) against the United States, seeking 
relief from the effects of climate change. Even though the IACHR would not be able to compel 
the U.S. to reduce its emissions or compensate the Inuit, even with a positive ruling in favour of 
the Inuit, the petition garnered attention and made climate change a human rights issue. Gage & 
Byers note that the risk of legal changes could expose Canadian oil and gas companies to financial 
damages through litigation: “nation-specific assessments of the potential for climate damages liti-
gation could overlook the significant and growing risks posed to large-scale greenhouse gas pro-
ducers from transnational lawsuits. These risks include the possibility that a judgment handed 
down by a court in one country could be enforced in the courts of another (including Canada)” 
(Gage & Byers, 2014, p. 6). Although not yet in use, there is also the potential risk that carbon-
tariffs are eventually employed against countries that do not mitigate sufficiently. 
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State of Knowledge 
The state of knowledge on global climate change itself has improved dramatically since the crea-
tion of the IPCC. Climate scientists understand the long-lived nature of certain greenhouse gases 
and the inertia that they impart to the climate system, such that even if emissions were to drop 
quite fantastically to zero in short order, the average warming trend would continue – by ap-
proximately a further 0.3-0.5oC over the next few centuries, in addition to the 0.85oC above 
preindustrial levels already observed (Frölicher, Winton, & Sarmiento, 2013). Currently, the na-
tionally determined contributions of the Paris Agreement put the world on track to warm by 2.6-
3.7oC above the preindustrial average by the end of the 21st century, higher than the Agreement’s 
2oC target (Caballero, 2016). Although the aspiration is to ratchet-up the ambition and accelerate 
the pace of mitigation over time, such that the 2oC target can be met, the later that this process 
begins, the less likely it is to be achieved. Some degree of climate adaptation being necessary is 
therefore already ensured. 
The nature and degree of such adaptation remains to be formulated, however, in part 
because what is and will be required remains unknown or highly uncertain. While preparing for 
surprises seems counter-intuitive, if not oxymoronic, this is the orientation that national and 
international policy-makers must take. An immediate first step is improving the state of 
knowledge not merely on the likely effects of climate change, but also on a country’s exposure 
to transnational effects and its adaptive capacity to address them. To this end, assessments of the 
international environment, like those of the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden, are im-
portant examples that other countries can follow, tailored to their own circumstances. Canada 
must engage in this exercise more completely than has been done up until this point. At the 
current moment, the state of knowledge on our exposure to climate change impacts elsewhere, 
and the balance of opportunities versus risks resulting therefrom, remains low. 
For example, the UK is aware that in three thematic spheres—business, food supplies, 
and foreign policy—the magnitude of even indirect climate change impacts could amount to bil-
lions of pounds in costs and tens of millions of UK citizens affected (Gledhill et al., 2013). Although 
they do not make quantitative estimates, the Netherlands’ assessment largely mirrors that of the 
UK: they find that the risk of disruption to vital economic networks increases rapidly as climate 
change progresses over the course of the century. Sweden and Finland have also engaged in such 
an analysis; along with the UK and the Netherlands, they employ a framework of analysis that 
appraises every country’s exposure and sensitivity to projected climate changes with which they 
have a relationship. In this way they can assess the nature and extent of potential risks that could 
reverberate back to them from impacts that occur elsewhere, whether along a financial or eco-
nomic pathway, a biophysical pathway, a migration pathway, or a foreign policy and security path-
way. 
Canada has not engaged in a single overarching assessment of this type. Where infor-
mation is available, it is field or industry specific—as with the thematic areas discussed above. We 
know, for example, that the economic risk to Canada’s hydrocarbon resource sector from ac-
celerating mitigation is high, and national and provincial policy-makers must begin planning for 
this industrial shift. We also know, however, that the effort to accelerate mitigation will mean 
not only room for growth in low-carbon goods and services industries, but in fact depends on 
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such growth in the low-carbon sector; Canada could be moving much more rapidly into this 
economic space. In the Arctic, Canada must firmly establish where its sovereignty lay, before 
other countries can claim uncertainty as a basis for any actions. We also know that the require-
ments for aid in humanitarian crises and natural disasters will likely increase as the average warm-
ing trend continues, and that the security situation in many countries will deteriorate. But this 
knowledge is disparate, high-level, and there remains much that we do not know. Especially when 
compared to the internationally-focused assessments of the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, and 
Sweden, Canada would benefit greatly from a consolidated and much more extensive primary 
research project on this topic. 
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Additional Resources 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – Fifth Assessment Report: Represents the gold 
standard in expert knowledge on climate change. 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ 
 
UNEP – Global Environmental Outlook-5 Report: A report on the interface between human 
activity and the broader global environment, including climate change. 
http://www.unep.org/geo/assessments/global-assessments/global-environment-outlook-5 
 
World Resources Institute: A notable think tank which studies climate change, sustainability, and 
other matters related to global environmental policy. 
http://www.wri.org/ 
 
Stockholm Environment Institute: Another think tank which studies climate change and other 
issues of the global environment. 
https://www.sei-international.org/ 
 
Chatham House – resourcetrade.earth: A data visualization tool that can represent various envi-
ronmental indicators. 
https://resourcetrade.earth/data  
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Knowledge Mobilization 
The results of this research will benefit academics from across multiple disciplines, seeking to find 
avenues of research to pursue on climate change which have so far been inadequately studied. It 
may also be a useful guidance for researchers in government, NGOs, and private businesses that 
fare grappling with indirect impacts of climate change. Since the impacts of climate change are so 
all-encompassing and territorially unbounded, it will have universal applicability across multiple 
governance scales. 
 The objective of our research team is to communicate these findings through various 
kinds of web and print publications. Some of the expected products of this research include a 
synthesis report for multiple audiences, a series of policy briefs, a scholarly peer-reviewed journal 
article, and newspaper opinion articles. This research will also be a key input into the Network 
of Centres of Excellence (NCE) proposal on climate adaptation and resilience, under the super-
vision of prof. Daniel Scott at the University of Waterloo. 
 
Conclusion 
Climate change is occurring, and a warmer world of some degree is a reality that Canada will 
increasingly have to confront. This report has detailed the strengths and gaps in our understanding 
of how Canadian leaders are preparing for such a world. Overall, the approach thus far has been 
primarily inward-looking, with a focus on how biophysical changes within our borders will affect 
Canadian citizens and industries. This work is certainly necessary and should continue. Consid-
ering the global nature of climate change, however, and the degree of integration between econ-
omies today, it is clear that biophysical changes and policy adaptations outside our borders could 
potentially affect Canada greatly. Analyses of a warming climate’s international effects on Canada 
exist, but are minimal and disconnected from one another. Compared to the domestic half of 
this body of research, the international half represents an overarching knowledge gap. We are 
simply uncertain how much and in what ways the international effects of climate change may 
affect us. 
It is difficult to prepare for uncertain circumstances, but it should also be appreciated that 
the degree of warming that obtains in the future is determined by actions taken today—not only 
those of Canada, of course, but of everyone. Being a resource- and emissions-intensive economy 
implies a different—and difficult—transition ahead. But if Canada should hope to meet its inter-
national climate commitments, and help ensure a less climate-disrupted world than the one we 
are currently heading towards, a prepared-for transition can only be better than one that is not 
prepared for. An essential piece of this preparation is to be aware of the ways that any degree of 
climate-disruption could affect us, directly and indirectly. Yet, without a globally-focused assess-
ment, we do not have a full and accurate understanding of the potential risks and costs involved 
for Canada. Undertaking such an assessment would only be a first step, but a useful one. 
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